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A multidimensional financial system could provide benefits for individuals, companies, and states.
Instead of top-down control, which is destined to eventually fail in a hyperconnected world, a
bottom-up creation of value can unleash creative potential and drive innovations. Multiple currency
dimensions can represent different externalities and thus enable the design of incentives and feedback
mechanisms that foster the ability of complex dynamical systems to self-organize and lead to a more
resilient society and sustainable economy. Modern information and communication technologies
play a crucial role in this process, as Web 2.0 and online social networks promote cooperation and
collaboration on unprecedented scales. Within this contribution, we discuss how one dimension of a
multidimensional currency system could represent socio-digital capital (Social Bitcoins) that can be
generated in a bottom-up way by individuals who perform search and navigation tasks in a future
version of the digital world. The incentive to mine Social Bitcoins could sustain digital diversity,
which mitigates the risk of totalitarian control by powerful monopolies of information and can create
new business opportunities needed in times where a large fraction of current jobs is estimated to
disappear due to computerisation.
Keywords: Multidimensional incentive system, self-organization, qualified money, digital revolution, digital
diversity, decentralization, information routing, Social Bitcoin
I. MODERN SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
REQUIRE A NEW APPROACH
Nowadays we are facing a number of serious problems
such as financial instabilities, an unsustainable economy
and related global warming, the lack of social cooperation
and collaboration causing the rise of conflict, terrorism
and war. Traditional approaches to remedy such prob-
lems are based on top-down control. Whereas in the past
this way of thinking worked reasonably well, the high
interconnectivity in modern systems will eventually but
unavoidably lead to its failure as systems become un-
controllable by central entities due to stronger internal
effects, leading to often unpredictable cascading behav-
ior [1] and catastrophic failures [2].
Instead of entirely top-down based approaches, de-
signing mechanisms to promote desired results like in-
creased cooperation, coordination, and better resource
efficiency could help to deal with current socio-economic
challenges. Importantly, a multidimensional incentive
system is needed to design the desired interactions and
appropriate feedback mechanisms [3, 4]. Such incentives
have to be implemented in a bottom-up way, allowing
systems to self-organize [5] and thus promoting creativ-
ity, innovation, and diversity [6].
Diversity acts as a motor of innovation, can promote
collective intelligence [7], and is fundamental for the re-
silience of society [8, 9]. This renders socio-economic and
cultural diversity equally important as biodiversity. The
importance of diversity, however, is not restricted to in-
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dividual, cultural, social, or economic domains. For in-
stance, diversity among digital services in competition for
the attention of users can mitigate the risk of totalitarian
control and manipulation by extremely powerful monop-
olies of information. As we explain in Sec. III C, the loss
of diversity in the digital world can lead to a systematic
and irreversible collapse of the digital ecosystem [10, 11],
akin to the loss of biodiversity in the physical ecosys-
tem. Such a collapse can have dramatic consequences for
the freedom of information and eventually for the free-
dom of society. In this contribution, we show how such
a catastrophic collapse could be avoided on a systematic
level by introducing a multidimensional incentive system
in which an appropriately designed cryptocurrency pro-
vides an incentive for individuals to perform certain tasks
in their socio-digital environment. We refer to this cryp-
tocurrency as “Social Bitcoins”1.
Importantly, to successfully meet these challenges,
tools, ideas and concepts from complexity science have
to be combined with technologies like the blockchain,
economic knowledge (and potentially Internet of Things
technology to measure “externalities”).
II. A MULTIDIMENSIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
The invention of money has led to unprecedented
wealth and has provided countless benefits for society.
However, the current monetary system is not appropri-
1 The details of the implementation of such a cryptocurrency is
beyond the scope of this contribution.
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2ate any more to control highly interconnected dynami-
cal complex systems like the ones our economy and fi-
nancial system nowadays form. Whereas such systems
are in general difficult to control and understand and
nearly impossible to predict, they exhibit the tendency
to self-organize [5, 12]. New approaches to face todays
challenges should therefore take advantage of this system
intrinsic tendency.
Central banks like the ECB can control the amount
of money in the market by means ranging from adjust-
ing interest rates to quantitative easing. Recently, the
ECB has lowered interest rates to the lowest value of all
time (even introducing negative rates for some bank de-
posits [13]) and has further increased its efforts to buy
government bonds [14]. These measures are intended to
boost economy and increase inflation in the Euro zone
to the target of 2%. Despite these efforts, inflation has
remained close to 0%, raising doubts about the capac-
ity to act and the credibility of the ECB [15]. Further-
more, liquidity pumped into the market does not reach
efficiently enough the real economy. As a consequence re-
cently “helicopter money” has been discussed as a possi-
ble solution [16, 17]. Importantly, these problems are not
limited to the Euro zone. For example, due to the inter-
connected nature of our economic and financial systems,
the state of the global economy limits the decisions the
Fed can take concerning a raise of interest rates, as such
a raise could pose a threat for the global economy [18].
The problem is that the current monetary system pro-
vides only a one-dimensional control variable. Let us
consider the human body and how it self-organizes as an
example. To ensure its healthy function, it is not enough
to adjust only the amount of water one drinks. Instead,
the body needs water, air, carbohydrate, different pro-
teins and vitamins, mineral nutrients and more. None
of these needs can be replaced by another. Why should
this be different in systems like our economy, the financial
system, or society?
Indeed, a multidimensional currency system could help
to solve the problems mentioned above, where the differ-
ent dimensions can be converted at a low (or negligible)
cost. Such multidimensional incentive system could be
used to promote self-organization of financial and eco-
nomic systems in a bottom-up way [19]. This opens the
door to “Capitalism 2.0” and “Finance 4.0” (see [20–23]
for details).
A special case of a multidimensional incentive system
is “qualified money”. The concept was first introduced
by Dirk Helbing in [19, 22]. Instead of a scalar (one-
dimensional) quantity, like the Euro or any other cur-
rency, money could be multidimensional and earn its own
reputation. To illustrate this, consider the example that
there were two dimensions of money. By law, the first
could only be invested into real values, but not into fi-
nancial products. Instead, the latter dimension could.
There would be an exchange rate (and cost) to convert
one dimension into the other. As a consequence, the ECB
could increase the amount of money for real investments
directly, hence avoiding the problem mentioned earlier.
In other words, the decision space on which institutions
like the ECB can act would considerably increase without
them acting outside of their mandate. Qualified money,
which could be realized in a Bitcoin-like [24] way2, could
earn its own reputation depending on how and where it
was created and what businesses it supports. The repu-
tation then can give the money more or less value, which
can lead to a more sustainable economy as sustainability
would become measurable and transparent to individuals
(for details see [20, 22]). The concept of qualified money
is not limited to the above described two dimensions. In-
stead, everything people care about can be represented
by a dimension in the currency vector. As we explain in
the following, one dimension of qualified money could be
socio-digital capital that can be acquired in the digital
world.
Modern information and communication technologies
play an important role in facing todays challenges.
Indeed, nowadays the digital and physical world are
strongly interdependent and cannot be treated in isola-
tion any more [1]. The huge success of Web 2.0 and online
social networks is changing the way humans interact at
a global scale. They promote cooperation and collabora-
tion on unprecedented scales, but at the same time pow-
erful monopolies of information have the power to alter
individuals’ emotions and decisions [25, 26]. Supercom-
puters nowadays perform a large fraction of all financial
transactions, hence influencing the prices of important
commodities, which can lead to starving, conflicts, war,
etc. Information and communication technologies thus
are both a crucial part of the problems society has to
solve as well as a fundamental and promising piece of the
solution.
III. DECENTRALIZED INFORMATION
ARCHITECTURES AND QUALIFIED MONEY: A
SOCIAL BITCOIN
A. Decentralized architectures
The existence of powerful monopolies of information
like big IT-companies or even some governments can lead
to the loss of control by individuals, companies, or states.
Besides, the economic damage attributed to cybercrime
is growing exponentially and is estimated to reach 2.1
trillion dollars in 2019 [27]. Hence, it is time to design
more resilient information and communication technolo-
gies that—by design—cannot be exploited by single enti-
ties. Decentralized architectures naturally provide these
benefits [28–30].
2 That means, transactions are transparent. It is important to
have a dimension of qualified money which cannot be tracked,
and this dimension should loose value more rapidly to incentive
spending it soon. See [22] for details.
3B. Social Bitcoins and Web 4.0
As explained earlier, the main idea behind qualified
money is to price a broader spectrum of externalities.
This means that it can be applied to, for instance, infor-
mation. This can be realized in many different ways. The
exact details would probably emerge in a self-organized
way, depending on choices and preferences of individu-
als. But how could such a system look like and what
benefits would it provide? Here, we discuss a possible
vision in which one dimension of qualified money, socio-
digital capital, can be priced in terms of Social Bitcoins
that can be mined using online social networks and dig-
ital infrastructures. It is impossible to foresee the exact
details of such a system, nevertheless, in the following
we will sketch a possible vision of a future Internet and
digital world in which individuals perform the routing of
messages and information using their social contacts and
technological connections rather than relying on service
providers.
The use of the Internet has changed fundamentally
since its invention. At first, it was a collection of static
web pages. Then, Web 2.0 emerged as “a collaborative
medium, a place where we [could] all meet and read and
write” [31]. Consequently, Web 3.0 constitutes a “Se-
mantic Web” [31], where data can be processed by ma-
chines. Let us refer to a digital world in which infor-
mation is managed in a bottom-up way, free of central
monopolies in control of the vast majority of informa-
tion, as Web 4.03. A digital democracy [28], if you will.
Assume that this digital world was composed of many in-
teracting, decentralized systems, which—in the absence
of central control—compete for the attention of individ-
uals [10, 11]. As we explain in Sec. III C, such a state is
possible but fragile. Now assume that, in the future of the
Internet, each individual routes information using their
social and technological connections rather than relying
on service providers4. In decentralized architectures, this
task has to be performed relying only on local knowledge.
As shown in [33], this type of routing can be performed
very efficiently and—most importantly—can be perfected
if individuals actively use multiple networks simultane-
ously5. This fact constitutes an important starting point
to design appropriate incentives to sustain digital democ-
racy.
Assume that individuals could earn Social Bitcoins by
3 In [32] Web 4.0 is described as follows: “Web 4.0 will be as
a read-write-execution-concurrency web with intelligent interac-
tions, but there is still no exact definition of it. Web 4.0 is also
known as symbiotic web in which human mind and machines can
interact in symbiosis.”
4 It is important to note that this new type of information rout-
ing requires efficient and secure encryption to ensure privacy of
individuals, whenever they wish so.
5 This is only the case if the different networks are related such
that they exhibit geometric correlations. As shown in [33], real
systems obey this condition.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the incentive to mine Social
Bitcoins. Social Bitcoins form one dimension of qualified
money and can be mined by performing search and naviga-
tion tasks using social and technological connections in a fu-
ture digital world. Hence, acquiring Social Bitcoins consti-
tutes an incentive to perform routing. Individuals optimize
their strategy to route information and will be active simulta-
neously in more networks, as this (among other aspects [34])
increases routing performance [33]. Performing routing in less
active networks could increase the reputation of the mined So-
cial Bitcoins, providing an additional incentive to engage in
less active networks. This then could sustain digital diver-
sity [10, 11] and at the same time increase the performance
of routing. Icon credits: Mourad Mokrane, lastspark, and
Joshua Jones from thenounproject.com (CC BY 3.0).
routing information in the way explained above. These
Social Bitcoins would form a dimension of qualified
money [19, 20, 22] and could (with some additional cost)
be exchanged and hence converted into other dimensions
of the currency vector. Their exchange rate would de-
pend on the trust individuals have in the system and
how much they value their socio-digital environment.
The important point is that now individuals have an in-
centive to route information (“mining” Social Bitcoins).
As a consequence, individuals will optimize to some ex-
tend their capabilities to perform this action. As ex-
plained above and shown in [33], the routing success can
be increased and even perfected if individuals actively
use many networks simultaneously6. Hence, the intro-
duction of a Social Bitcoin would constitute an incentive
to be active in several networks, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In addition, search and navigation tasks taking place in
6 In addition, there are other aspects individuals might optimize,
see for instance [34].
4less active networks could increase the reputation of the
mined Social Bitcoins, providing further incentive to en-
gage in less active networks. In other words, sustainabil-
ity in the digital world could be priced and would be-
come transparent to individuals who then could adjust
their behavior accordingly. Importantly, as we explain
in detail in the following, this optimization could make
digital diversity robust and sustainable.
C. How a Social Bitcoin could sustain digital
diversity
Here, we present a mathematical model to illustrate
the potential effect of a Social Bitcoin. As mentioned
earlier, many digital services compete for the attention of
individuals. In this context, the attention of users can be
considered a scarce resource and hence the digital world
forms a complex ecosystem in which networks represent
competing species. A concise description of the digital
ecology was developed in [10]. In a nutshell, multiple
online social networks compete for the attention of indi-
viduals in addition to obeying their intrinsic evolutionary
dynamics. This dynamics is given by two main mecha-
nisms, the influence of mass media and a viral spreading
dynamics acting on top of pre-existing underlying offline
social networks [35]. Importantly, the parameter that
quantifies the strength of viral spreading, λ, determines
the final fate of the network. If λ is below a critical
value λc, the network will eventually become entirely pas-
sive, with corresponds to the death of the network. On
the other hand, for λ > λc, the activity of the network
is sustained [35, 36]. The competition between multi-
ple networks can be modeled assuming that more active
networks are more attractive to users. Hence, the total
virality, which reflects the overall involvement of indi-
viduals in online social networks, is distributed between
the different networks as a function of their activities.
More active networks obtain a higher share of the viral-
ity, which then makes these networks more active. Note
that this induces a rich-get-richer effect. Interestingly,
despite this positive feedback loop, diminishing returns
induced by the network dynamics allows for a stable coex-
istence (digital diversity) of several networks in a certain
parameter range (we refer the reader to [10] for details).
The system can be described by the following mean-
field equations7
ρ˙ai = ρ
a
i
{
λ 〈k〉ωi(ρa) [1− ρai ]− 1
}
, i = 1, . . . , n , (1)
where ρai denotes the fraction of active users in network i,
λ is the total virality mentioned earlier, and 〈k〉 denotes
7 In the framework of [10], these equations are the result of taking
the limit of ν →∞, where ν describes the ratio between the rate
at which the viral spreading and the influence of mass media
occur. As shown in [10], taking this limit has no impact on the
stability of the system.
the mean degree of the network, i.e. the average number
of connections each node has. The weights ωi(ρ
a) depend
on the activities in all networks, ρa = (ρa1, ρ
a
2, . . . , ρ
a
n),
and govern the distribution of virality between different
networks. In [10] we used ωi(ρ
a) = [ρai ]
σ
/
∑n
j=1
[
ρaj
]σ
,
where σ denotes the activity affinity that quantifies how
much more prone individuals are to engage in more active
networks.
As mentioned earlier, assume that the introduction of
Social Bitcoins incentivizes users to simultaneously use
multiple networks in order to increase their capabilities
to successfully perform search and navigation tasks and
hence increase their expected payoff. The exact form of
this incentive depends on the details of the implemen-
tation of the systems’ architectures and Social Bitcoins,
which comprises an interesting future research direction.
Here, we model the additional tendency of individuals to
engage in multiple (and less active) networks by shift-
ing the weight of the distribution of the virality towards
networks with lower activity, hence hindering the rich-
get-richer effect described earlier. In particular, let us
consider the following form of the weight function,
ωi(ρ
a) =
[ρai ]
σ∑nl
j=1
[
ρaj
]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
rich-get-richer [10]
+ ξ(〈ρa〉 − ρai )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social Bitcoin incentive
, (2)
where ξ is a parameter proportional to the value of Social
Bitcoins and 〈ρa〉 = 1n
∑n
i=1 ρ
a
i denotes the mean activity
among all networks.
The effect of the inclusion of the new term (“Social
Bitcoin incentive”) in Eq. (2) can change the behavior
of the system dramatically if ξ is large enough, which
we illustrate8 for two competing networks. Let us first
consider the case of ξ = 0.2. In this case, the qualitative
behavior of the system is similar to the one in absence of
Social Bitcoins as described in [10]. Below a critical value
of the activity affinity, σ < σc, coexistence is possible
(solid green central branch in Fig. 2 (top) & central green
diamond in Fig. 2 (middle, left)), but—once lost—cannot
be recovered.
To illustrate this, assume that we start with σ < σc and
the system approaches the coexistence solution (central
green diamond in Fig. 2 (middle, left)). Then, we change
σ to some value larger than σc. Hence, the coexistence
solution becomes unstable and the system eventually ap-
proaches the solution where either ρ1 = 0 or ρ2 = 0
(green diamonds in Fig. 2 (middle, right)). Now, after
changing σ back to a value below σc, the system does
not return to the again stable coexistence state, but in-
stead remains in the domination state, which is also sta-
ble (outer green diamonds in Fig. 2 (middle, left)). This
8 Here we present only a brief discussion of the dynamical system
given by Eqns. (1) and (2). A more detailed analysis and the
investigation of different forms of the incentive term in Eq. (2)
is left for future research.
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Figure 2. Fragility of digital diversity. Here, we consider
two networks, λ 〈k〉 = 2 and ξ = 0.2. Top: Bifurcation dia-
gram (subcritical pitchfork bifurcation). ρi denotes the frac-
tion of active users in network i. Green solid lines represent
stable solutions and red dashed lines correspond to unstable
fixed points. Middle: Stream line plots for σ = 0.75 (left)
and σ = 1.5 (right). Bottom: Evolution of the system for
initial conditions ρ1 = 0.4, ρ2 = 0.3. For 15 ≤ t < 45 (be-
tween the dashed lines) we set σ = 1.5 and otherwise we set
σ = 0.75.
example is illustrated in Fig. 2 (bottom), where we ex-
plicitly show the evolution of the fraction of active users
for both networks9. To conclude, the system is fragile in
the sense that an irreversible loss of digital diversity is
possible—similar to the loss of biodiversity.
Interestingly, for a higher value of ξ the behavior of the
system differs dramatically, which we illustrate here for
ξ = 1. The solution corresponding to equal coexistence
9 Note that here we describe an idealized system without noise.
Noise in real systems would speed up significantly the separation
of the trajectories in Fig. 2 (bottom) shortly after the first dashed
gray line.
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Figure 3. Robustness of digital diversity. Here, we con-
sider two networks, λ 〈k〉 = 2 and ξ = 1.0. Top: Bifurcation
diagram. ρi denotes the fraction of active users in network
i. Green solid lines represent stable solutions and red dashed
lines correspond to unstable fixed points. For better readabil-
ity, here we do not show the unstable fixed points for ρ1 = 0
and ρ2 = 0. Middle: Stream line plots for σ = 0.75 (left)
and σ = 2.5 (right). Bottom: Evolution of the system for
initial conditions ρ1 = 0.4, ρ2 = 0.3. For 30 ≤ t < 80 (be-
tween the dashed lines) we set σ = 2.5 and otherwise we set
σ = 1.75.
of two networks, hence ρ1 = ρ2 6= 0, is stable as before for
values of σ below some critical value σc. However, in this
regime now the domination solutions (ρ1 = 0 or ρ2 = 0,
denoted by the red squares in Fig. 3 (middle, left)) are un-
stable. This means that, independently from the initial
conditions, in this regime the system always approaches
the coexistence solution. For σ > σc the equal coexis-
tence solution becomes unstable and new stable solutions
emerge (green diamonds in Fig. 3 (middle, right)). These
unequal coexistence solutions correspond to the case that
one network has a significantly higher activity than the
other, but the activities of both networks are sustained.
Let us again consider the explicit example of two net-
6works and start with σ < σc. The system approaches the
equal coexistence solution (green square in Fig. 3 (mid-
dle, left)). Then, we change σ to some value above σc.
Now, the system approaches the unequal coexistence so-
lution (green diamonds in Fig. 3 (middle, right)), but now
the activity in both networks is sustained. By lowering σ
again below σc, the system recovers the equal coexistence
solution, in contrast to the previous case. This example
is shown in Fig. 3 (bottom) where we present the fraction
of active users in both networks. To conclude, in contrast
to the case discussed before, the system is robust in the
sense that an irreversible loss of digital diversity cannot
occur.
To sum up, the introduction of a multidimensional in-
centive system in which one dimension represents socio-
digital capital in terms of Social Bitcoins that can be
mined by performing search and navigation tasks in a
future digital world can make digital diversity robust—
given that the value of Social Bitcoins is high enough.
IV. OUTLOOK AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
A multidimensional financial system offers manifold
success opportunities for individuals, companies, and
states. Top-down control alone is destined to fail in a
hyperconnected world. Hence, we need a new approach
that incorporates the bottom-up empowerment of soci-
ety and the right incentives and feedback mechanisms to
promote creativity and innovations. The initiative “A
nation of makers” [37] in the US as well as the rise of
citizen science [38] constitute promising starting points
for such a development. Nevertheless, increasing finan-
cial instabilities emphasize the pressing need to redesign
certain aspects of the financial system, hence the urge to
create “Finance 4.0” [22].
In this perspective, multiple monetary dimensions
could represent different externalities (negative ones like
noise, environmental damage, etc. and positive ones
such as recycling of resources, cooperation, creation of
new jobs and so on). Building on this framework, ap-
propriate feedback and coordination mechanisms could
increase resource efficiency and lead to a more sustain-
able, circular, cooperative economy. This can be achieved
in a bottom-up way in terms of an improved version of
capitalism based on the abilities of self-organization in-
trinsically present in dynamical complex systems by ac-
counting for externalities in a multidimensional incentive
system. The Internet of Things and the blockchain tech-
nology underlying the Bitcoin architecture provide the
technological requirements to realize “Finance 4.0” and
“Capitalism 2.0” based on knowledge from the science of
complex systems [20–23, 39].
Nowadays, the digital and physical world are strongly
interdependent. We have presented an example how a
multidimensional incentive system, in particular a So-
cial Bitcoin generated in a bottom-up way by perform-
ing search and navigation tasks in a possible future digi-
tal world can sustain digital diversity, which is essential
for the freedom of information. Furthermore, a diverse
digital landscape is expected to create business opportu-
nities for individuals and companies [4, 21, 39] facing the
disappearance of half of todays jobs [40]. The price of
Social Bitcoins is crucial for the desired effect of sustain-
ing digital diversity. This price, however, is determined
dynamically by the market and may depend on other di-
mensions of the currency system. The development of
a concise and general theory of this system and possi-
ble implementations comprise interesting future research
directions.
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